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Purpose ± In the last decade, the Chinese government enacted two rule-based policy changes 
related to property rights; namely, a constitutional amendment to protect the lawful rights of 
the private sector in 2004 and a property rights law in 2007. Using property rights theory, this 
study hypothesizes the contingent effect that these property rights changes have on the 
investment of individual human and financial capital towards entrepreneurship. In addition, 
this study also explores whether property rights changes have a differential effect on the two 
forms of entrepreneurship, namely, opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship. 
Design/methodology/approach ± This research uses logit regression analysis on a two-
period model using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) database to test these 
effects. 
Findings ± Contrary to existing evidence from Western contexts, this study finds that 
property rights changes have a significant influence on the investment of both forms of 
capital towards necessity entrepreneurship in China.   
Research limitations ± The use of a secondary database like GEM has certain limitations, 
such as the non-availability of data on a longitudinal basis, and the need to operationalize 
certain constructs like human and financial capital as non-continuous variables.   
Originality/value ± There has been limited research on the phenomena of necessity 
entrepreneurship in economies such as that of China. The findings of this study highlight that 
property rights protection is equally important for necessity entrepreneurship in institutional 
contexts like China. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Property rights, Logit regression, Emerging markets, China 






China is the largest transition economy in the world today, making an institutional shift from 
relationship-based to rule-based transactions (Krug and Hendrischke, 2008; Li, 2013; Rottig, 
2016). Considering the heavily state-based, government-run legal system backing this 
institutional transition, the creation of entrepreneurship in China is seen as very different 
from that in other economies (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2002; Nee and Opper, 2012; Opper and 
Nee, 2015; Chatterjee and Sahasranamam, 2018). A key rule-based policy measure enabling 
entrepreneurship and innovation is the protection of property rights, since this incentivizes 
individuals to innovate (Teece, 1986; Li, 2004). This paper studies the effect of a property 
protection regime on entrepreneurship in China, and specifically on the investment of human 
DQG¿QDQFLDOFDSLWDOWRZDUGVHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS 
In the wake of economic reforms in China, a series of economic activities were 
unleashed. Domestic entrepreneurial organizations, including town and village enterprises, 
transformed state-owned enterprises and private start-ups, and emerged as significant driving 
forces behind the rapid economic growth and job creation in China (Huang, 2008; The 
Economist, 2011). In the past decade and a half, the gradual weakening of Chinese state 
control of the economy has changed the institutional and incentive regime, encouraging the 
emergence of new enterprises (Bruton et al., 2010; Alon and Rottig, 2013; Shen and Tsai, 
2016). For example, the time required for starting a business has decreased from 48 days in 
2004 to 33 days in 2014 (World Bank, 2015a). This ease of starting a business has led to an 
increase in the entrepreneurship rate from 13.05% in 2004 to 31.3% in 2014 (World Bank, 
2015b). Despite this marked increase, academic research has paid limited attention towards a 
scholarly understanding of the effect of institutional transition towards a rule-based 
transaction regime on entrepreneurship in China (Yamakawa et al., 2013; Ahlstrom and 
Ding, 2014; Bruton and Chen, 2016; Chatterjee and Sahasranamam, 2018). 
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In an attempt to respond to the research gap mentioned above, and drawing on 
property rights theory, this study explores the following question: what is the contingent 
effect property rights policy changes have on the investment of individual human capital and 
financial capital towards entrepreneurship in China? China has a tradition of supporting and 
protecting its state-owned enterprises (Li, 2004). As a result, these established organizations 
have always been in a better position than individuals to benefit from the legal and 
government infrastructure (Deng et al., 2010; Alon et al., 2013; Shu, 2017). First, they were 
in a position to enforce regulations that restrict the actions of their start-up competitors 
(Shane, 2001; Krug and Hendrischke, 2003). Second, with greater access to political and 
RWKHU IRUPDO DQG LQIRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQDO UHVRXUFHV WKH\ FRXOG LQIULQJH RQ D QHZ YHQWXUH¶V
unique concept (Li, 2004; Kim and Li, 2014). The Chinese government enacted two 
fundamental policy changes related to property rights to tilt this upper hand of state 
enterprises in favor of entrepreneurship, namely, the constitutional amendment to protect 
lawful rights of the private sector in 2004 and the property rights law in 2007.  
The implementation of the property rights policy changes in 2004 and 2007 offers us 
a unique setting to study private entrepreneurship in state-controlled economies like China 
(Krug and Hendrischke, 2003, 2008; Li, 2004; Brunt, 2011). Furthermore, to understand the 
effect that property rights changes have on entrepreneurship, this study analyzes the 
entrepreneurship entry data for two time periods, one before and the other after the 
implementation of the legislation. This research uses a cross-sectional data set consisting of 
over 2,000 observations collected by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) through its 
2002 and 2009 surveys that examine the relationship. Previous research has found that the 
institutional environment influences different forms of entrepreneurship, namely, opportunity 
and necessity entrepreneurship, differently (McMullen et al., 2008; Sambharya and Musteen, 
2014; Kuckertz et al., 2016). Hence, this study also tests for the effect of property rights 
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policy changes on the investment of individual resources towards these two forms of 
entrepreneurship. Opportunity entrepreneurs are those who are involved in start-up activity as 
a result of a perceived business opportunity, while necessity entrepreneurs are involved in 
start-up activity for lack of alternative options (Galid and Levine, 1986; Reynolds et al., 
2005). A large volume of extant research has focused only on opportunity entrepreneurship, 
which includes high-growth, high-potential ventures that emphasize innovation and job 
creation (Bergmann and Sternberg, 2007; McMullen et al., 2008; Kuckertz et al., 2016). In 
emerging markets like China, there is a significant and widespread presence of necessity 
entrepreneurship (Deng et al., 2010; Sahasranamam and Sud, 2016). However, limited 
research has explored this phenomenon (Alon and Rottig, 2013; Bruton and Chen, 2016). 
This study contributes to filling this research gap. 
2. Evolution of entrepreneurship in China 
The development of enterprise in China is a matter of significant academic interest for 
sinologists and policy-makers for several reasons (Krug and Hendrischke, 2003, 2008; Li, 
2004; Nee and Opper, 2012; Shen and Tsai, 2016). First, it offers a setting to conduct 
observational studies to assess outcomes based on various policy interventions. For instance, 
from ancient times, constant tensions in policy-making have arisen due to policy shifts from 
centralization (junquan) to decentralization (fenquan) and then back to centralization (Liu, 
1986). Just like other aspects of China, private entrepreneurship has also witnessed 
significant changes depending on government policies. Second, the Chinese case is also 
unique for studies related to entrepreneurship because, unlike in other countries, one does not 
notice the simultaneous coexistence of factors enabling necessity and opportunity 
entrepreneurship in post-1949 China. Furthermore, during the reforms era, China witnessed a 
rise of private entrepreneurs in eastern coastal regions, with relationship-based transactions 
(guanxi) helping to overcome the hurdles of the formal institutions. It was these informal 
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institutions which caused institutional changes conducive to the encouragement of private 
entrepreneurship (Nee and Opper, 2012). In short, the Chinese case is unique because, unlike 
other regions, one witnesses here the emergence of informal institutions to facilitate necessity 
entrepreneurship. Such a rise has led to the formation of official policies that have ultimately 
paved the way for the development of an ecosystem encouraging opportunity 
entrepreneurship.  
Entrepreneurship experienced a boost in Republican China in the first decades of the 
20th century (Rawski, 1989). Once the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, the 
market economy was transformed into a socialist economy. During the first 30 years of the 
People¶s Republic of China, private entrepreneurship was largely eradicated. With the 
economy in abysmal shape, the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping launched the Four 
Modernizations under the auspices of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978. However, the effect of the 
reforms was concentrated primarily in the coastal regions, with inland areas undergoing 
limited change (Nee, 1992). 
The 15th Party Congress in September 1997 marked a significant shift in the Chinese 
ownership system. Following this Congress, state ownership was downgraded to a ³pillar of 
the economy´DQGSULYDWHRZQHUVKLSZDVHOHYDWHGWREHLQJDQ³LPSRUWDQWFRPSRQHQWRIWKH
HFRQRP\´ (Qian and Wu, 2000). This Congress also, and for the first time, explicitly 
emphasized ³the rule of law´. In 1998, the government even paved the way for reforms to 
promote venture capital and private equity investment. For example, the State Council 
approved a government document in 1999 titled ³several opinions on establishing a venture 
investment mechanism´, released jointly by the Ministry of Science and Technology and 
State Development Commission (Xu and Zhang, 2009). The document set out guidelines for 
venture capital regulation in China. In March 1999, at the second plenary of the Ninth 
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National People¶s Congress, a constitutional amendment affirmed that individually owned 
and private business are important components of the socialist market economy (Liu, 2002). 
Thus, unlike the initial stages of reforms, the Chinese state put the private sector on the same 
legal footing as the public sector for the first time. 
In 2003, the Law on the Promotion of Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) 
became the first special law for such entrepreneurial organizations in China. In 2004, the 
JRYHUQPHQWDPHQGHGWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQWR³protect the lawful rights and interests of the private 
sector´. Following this, regulations concerning the creation, transfer, and ownership of 
property were put in place with the 2007 Property Rights Law (Nee and Opper, 2012). These 
legislative initiatives marked an attempt to transition from relationship-based transactions 
(guanxi) to rule-based transactions (Krug and Hendrischke, 2003, 2008). Such an institutional 
change was essential for the economy to be competitive in the international market (Li and 
Li, 2000; Peng, 2003; Li, 2004). Given this institutional transition, this study focuses on how 
the property rights policy changes have influenced individualV¶ willingness to invest their 
human and financial capital towards entrepreneurship. 
3. Hypotheses development 
Since the seminal work by Shane and Venkataraman (2000), the primary focus of 
entrepreneurship research has been on early stage phenomena and the study of how 
opportunities are detected and acted upon, or how new organizations come into being. 
EQWUHSUHQHXULDODFWLRQLQYROYHVRSSRUWXQLW\DQGPRWLYDWLRQLQDGGLWLRQWRLQGLYLGXDOV¶DELOLW\
(McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; McMullen and Dimov, 2013). Opportunity identification 
and motivation are to a large extent determined by the institutional context in which the 
individual is situated, and so too are the returns expected from investment towards 
entrepreneurship (McMullen et al., 2008; Autio and Acs, 2010). The external environment of 
a country places UHVWULFWLRQVRQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDELOLW\ to start a new business (Baker et al., 
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2005; Taormina and Kin-Mei Lao, 2007). For example, as suggested earlier, during the early 
reform period in China it was complicated to set up private enterprises owing to the adverse 
policy regime. Entrepreneurship cannot be explained through personal resources alone 
without considering the individual and the country-level context (Shane and Venkataraman, 
2000; De Clercq et al., 2013). 
Entrepreneurial entry requires substantial resource mobilization. At an individual 
level, key resource requirements are in the form of human and financial capital (Autio and 
Acs, 2010; De Clercq et al., 2013). Individuals who are better placed regarding these 
resources are more likely to meet the challenges associated with identifying and exploiting 
new opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; De Clercq et al., 2013; Estrin et al., 
2016). 
Human capital refers to the educational level and skills of the individual (Becker, 
1994). People with higher education are likely to more easily find new ideas and 
opportunities (Shane, 2000; Hajizadeh and Zali, 2016). They are also better equipped to learn 
about new markets and technologies (Autio and Acs, 2010; Sahasranamam and Sud, 2016). 
Moreover, with greater formal education, individuals can develop better skills that enable 
them to better exploit opportunities (Grant, 1996; Dimov, 2017).  
Financial capital is needed to meet the initial cash flow requirements of the enterprise 
(Arenius and Minniti, 2005). It has been found that liquidity constraints limit individual 
entrepreneurship choice behavior (Bates, 1995). Compared with more developed economies, 
private enterprises and SMEs face significant restrictions in accessing finance from the 
Chinese banking sector (The Economist, 2011). A critical challenge faced by Chinese 
entrepreneurs has been their limited access to formal financing (Cong, 2009). In the absence 
of official sources of funding, entrepreneurs would need to resort to internal sources of 
¿QDQFLQJ RU ERRWVWUDSSLQJ DQG to XVH WKHLU ¿QDQFLDO DVVHWV RU WKRVH RI WKHLU KRXVHKROG RU
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friends (Liao and Sohmen, 2001; Arenius and Minniti, 2005). Moreover, during the initial 
stages of the venture, entrepreneurs have limited legitimacy and lack collateral (Wright et al., 
2006). Hence, individuals who have greater access to individual financial capital are more 
likely to be able to make an entrepreneurship entry choice in China. 
Previous research on entrepreneurship offers extensive evidence suggesting that 
individual human capital and personal financial capital has a positive effect on 
entrepreneurship entry choice (Dakhli and De Clercq, 2004; De Clercq et al., 2013; Marvel et 
al., 2016; Sahasranamam and Sud, 2016). The focus of this paper is, however, on the 
contingent role of property rights regime transition on the investment of these two capital 
forms towards entrepreneurship entry. 
According to Boettke and Coyne (2003), protection of property rights is an essential 
requirement for entrepreneurship. Property rights refer to the degree to which government 
creates the right to private property and enforces the laws written to protect that right 
(McMullen et al., 2008; Heritage Foundation, 2015). In an environment where property rights 
are hardly protected, contracts are difficult to enforce, competition is incomplete, and market 
entry is not free (Baumol, 1990; DeSoto, 2000; Autio and Acs, 2010; Estrin et al., 2013a). 
As mentioned earlier, access to education is essential to start an enterprise. Education 
contributes to the creation of two forms of human capital, namely, capital consisting of 
alienable components and that consisting of inalienable components (Moen, 2005). The 
cognitive abilities of the individual are inalienable and are hence embedded in the individual 
(Zucker et al., 2002). However, the products of the individual¶s ability and skills are alienable 
and can be separated from the person. These products can be traded in the marketplace, for 
example, by selling, licensing, trademarking, copyrighting, or franchising. The property 
rights regime in a country influences the alienable component of human capital and its 
investment towards entrepreneurship (Autio and Acs, 2010).  
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During periods of weak property rights, there are greater uncertainty and 
expropriation fears (Arora et al., 2001). In China, the combination of vague property rights, a 
high degree of informality, and unstable government regulators add to the uncertainty (Krug 
and Hendrischke, 2003; Li, 2004; Batjargal, 2007). Unpredictability influences the likelihood 
of investment of resources towards entrepreneurship entry when the investment entails 
substantial sunk costs 'L[LW2¶%ULHQ et al., 2003). Hence, in a weak property rights 
regime, individuals are more likely to utilize their human capital for paid employment rather 
than to invest it in starting a new venture. However, when there is stronger protection of 
property rights, lower fears of expropriation would encourage individuals to invest human 
capital towards starting a new venture (Teece, 1986).  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between individual human capital and the 
likelihood of an individual to start an enterprise in both pre- and post-property rights 
law periods in China, with the relationship being stronger in the post- than the pre-
property rights period. 
Similarly, for a weak property rights regime in a state-controlled economy, there 
invariably exists a greater fear of expropriation of wealth by the government (Batjargal, 2007; 
Nee and Opper, 2012). For example, a study by new firms in post-communist countries found 
that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits owing to fear of 
expropriation (Johnson et al., 2002). They have less fear of their wealth being expropriated in 
a stronger property rights regime (Anton and Yao, 1994; DeSoto, 2000). Moreover, when the 
markets are well functioning, individuals from high-income households can buy the alienable 
human capital produced by others (Arora et al., 2001; Autio and Acs, 2010) and start new 
ventures. Therefore, in the context of China, the effect of financial capital on 
entrepreneurship would be stronger during the post-property rights period than in the pre-
property rights period. 
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Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relation between individual financial capital and the 
likelihood of an individual to start an enterprise in both pre- and post-property rights 
law periods in China, with the relationship being stronger in the post- than the pre-
property rights law period. 
Though the widely acknowledged conceptualization of entrepreneurship is one of 
discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities (Venkataraman, 1997; Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000), more recently another variation of entrepreneurship has emerged: that 
of individuals who seek entrepreneurship due to a paucity of other options to earn a living. 
This facet of entrepreneurial behavior emerged from the GEM investigation that revealed 
high entrepreneurship rates in low-income countries (Reynolds et al., 2005). Such individuals 
who took up entrepreneurship for lack of choice have been termed ³necessity entrepreneurs´. 
Subsequently, multiple studies have explored necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship as 
separate forms of entrepreneurship (Block and Wagner, 2010; Block et al., 2015; Xavier-
Oliveira et al., 2015; Sahasranamam and Sud, 2016). 
In the case of China, the classification into necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship 
is relevant for the following reason. As mentioned earlier, one of the fundamental reasons 
behind the reform process in 1978 was the acute unemployment problem that resulted from 
the return of urban youth who had been sent to the countryside in the Mao era (Xu and Zhao, 
2008). Hence, during the reform period the aim of the government was to neutralize social 
discontent and improve the poor state of the economy by allowing the establishment of 
household business, and township and village enterprises. Given that large parts of China in 
general, and the rural areas in particular, were distressed because of the politics of the 
Cultural Revolution, many of the Chinese farmers in the countryside were more than willing 
to step into the unknown world of entrepreneurship. Thus, it will not be wrong to conclude 
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that the urge to start these enterprises was mostly inspired by necessity than by business 
opportunity.  
Opportunity entrepreneurship is considered a more innovative activity than necessity 
entrepreneurship (Xavier-Oliveira et al., 2015; Sahasranamam and Sud, 2016). Innovative 
entrepreneurial activity involves knowledge creation, and property rights must be protected to 
encourage it (Baumol, 2002). Strong property rights protection provides an incentive for 
entrepreneurial action of an innovative nature (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986). In the context 
of China, it has been found that individual human capital and financial capital are more likely 
to encourage opportunity entrepreneurship than necessity entrepreneurship (Sahasranamam 
and Sud, 2016). McMullen et al. (2008) have found that opportunity entrepreneurship was 
significantly related to property rights, while necessity entrepreneurship was not. As 
mentioned earlier, necessity entrepreneurship arises in the absence of alternative employment 
opportunities. Though necessity entrepreneurs may sometimes exploit opportunities, this is 
not their primary motivation (Ho and Wong, 2007). In summary, research on necessity 
entrepreneurship has argued that property rights would have no significant effect on it. 
However, considering the weak institutional environment, its dynamism and strong 
government control over the economy (Krug and Hendrischke, 2003, 2008; Shen and Tsai, 
2016), this paper argues that, in transitional economies like China, property rights protection 
is likely to have a positive moderating effect on individual resource investment towards both 
necessity entrepreneurship and opportunity entrepreneurship.  
Hypothesis 3a: There is a positive relation between individual human capital and the 
likelihood of an individual to enter opportunity entrepreneurship in both pre- and 
post-property rights law periods in China, with the relationship being stronger in the 
post- than pre-property rights period. 
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Hypothesis 3b: There is a positive relation between individual financial capital and 
the likelihood of an individual to enter opportunity in both pre- and post-property 
rights law periods in China, with the relationship being stronger in the post- than in 
the pre-property rights period. 
Hypothesis 4a: There is a positive relation between individual human capital and the 
likelihood of an individual to enter necessity entrepreneurship in both pre- and post-
property rights law periods in China, with the relationship being stronger in the post- 
than in the pre-property rights period. 
Hypothesis 4b: There is a positive relation between individual financial capital and 
the likelihood of an individual to enter necessity entrepreneurship in both pre- and 
post-property rights law periods in China, with the relationship being stronger in the 
post- than in the pre-property rights period. 
Figure 1 highlights WKHVWXG\¶V conceptual model. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
4. Data and methods 
To test the above hypotheses, this study uses data from the GEM Adult Population Survey 
(APS). This GEM database has been developed through surveys by private market-survey 
¿UPV ZLWK a representative weighted sample of at least 2,000 adults (aged 18±64 years) 
through telephone or face-to-face interviews in each country. Scholars consider GEM as a 
rich, reliable and valid survey (Reynolds et al., 2005). Using the APS data, GEM captures the 
total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) in the country (Alon et al., 2016). TEA has been the 
PDMRUIRFXVRISXEOLFDWLRQVEDVHGRQ*(0GDWDDQGLVGH¿QHGDVWKH³SHUFHQWDJHRIWKHDGXOW
population (18±64 years old) that is either actively involved in starting a new venture or is the 
RZQHUPDQDJHURIDEXVLQHVVWKDWLVOHVVWKDQPRQWKVROG´(Reynolds et al., 2002, pp. 5±
14 
 
6). In addition to TEA, GEM also captures the rate of opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurship. This classification of entrepreneurship into opportunity and necessity types 
was a result of uncovering the presence of high entrepreneurial rates in both developing and 
developed economies. In short, opportunity entrepreneurship focuses on current start-up 
attempts that perceive business opportunities, whereas necessity entrepreneurs start a 
business to make a living when confronted with a lack of alternatives.  
GEM carries out the data collection from different countries by collaborating with 
academic institutions. The GEM collaboration with academic institutions involves a 
substantial financial commitment by the participating institutions. Hence, there are periods 
when countries could not join the survey, resulting in gaps wherein data is not available. In 
the case of China, data is available for 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009. The rates of 
the two forms of entrepreneurship along with TEA in China for these years is provided in 
Table 1 (Sahasranamam and Sud, 2016).  
Table 2 highlights the other macro-environment characteristics of China for the period 
2002±2009 (World Bank, 2015c, 2015d). The GDP of China more than tripled during this 
time. According to world governance indicators data from the World Bank, which are 
consistent with the argument of better property rights and government regulation, it can be 
observed that governance effectiveness, rule of law and regulatory quality show the highest 
increase during the period. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
As mentioned earlier, two significant property rights policy changes occurred in 2004 
and 2007. This provides an opportunity to understand the effect of these policy changes on 
entrepreneurship (Phan et al., 2010; Brunt, 2011). This research uses the data from 2002 and 
2009 for the analysis, 2002 being two years ex ante the 2004 policy and 2009 being two years 
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ex post the 2007 policy. For the years 2002 and 2009, there are 2,054 and 3,608 respondents 
respectively in the GEM database.  
4.1. Dependent variable 
If the respondent was either ³involved in concrete activities to start up a new business´ or 
³owning and managing a business that was less than 42 months´, the likelihood of 
entrepreneurship entry is operationalized as a binary variable, which equals 1. This captured 
both nascent and new entrepreneurs (Reynolds et al., 2005; De Clercq et al., 2013). To 
categorize necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs, participants in the GEM survey were 
asked to indicate whether they were starting and growing their business to take advantage of 
a perceived unique market opportunity (opportunity entrepreneurship, 1 = yes). Furthermore, 
they were asked, if they felt it was the best option available for them (necessity 
entrepreneurship, 1 = yes). 
4.2. Independent variables 
The independent variables in the study are individual-level human and financial capital. 
Human capital is a dummy variable, equal to 1 when respondents indicated that their highest 
educational qualification was greater than post-secondary level (De Clercq and Arenius, 
2006; Minniti and Nardone, 2007). Financial capital is a dummy variable, equal to 1 when 
respondents indicated that ³WKH\EHORQJWRWKHPLGGOHRIKLJKHULQFRPHJURXSRIWKHFRXQWU\´
This approach was also followed in previous studies (Arenius and Minniti, 2005; Autio and 
Acs, 2010). 
4.3. Control variables 
The control variables were gender, age, fear of failure, and individual social capital. Gender 
was operationalized as a dummy variable (0 = female; 1 = male) (Verheul et al., 2006; 
Minniti and Nardone, 2007; Elam and Terjesen, 2010) and age as a continuous variable 
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(Autio and Acs, 2010). Previous research has found fear of failure to be negatively related to 
self-employment motivation in China (Wang et al., 2012). Hence, fear of failure was added 
as a control variable measured as a dummy variable using the following statement: ³Fear of 
failure would prevent me from starting a new business´ (1 = yes) (Autio and Acs, 2010). A 
dummy variable that assesses whether the respondent ³personally knew someone who had 
started a business in the past two years´ measured individual social capital (Minniti and 
Nardone, 2007; Klyver et al., 2008). Since entrepreneurship in China has traditionally grown 
regardless of the weak legal and financial system (mainly through the support of informal 
institutions and networks known as guanxi), it is particularly relevant in the Chinese context 
to control for the individual¶V social capital (Li and Li, 2000; Nee and Opper, 2012; Shi et al., 
2015). 
5. Results 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics, and Tables 4 and 5 depict the correlations. The 
YDULDQFHLQÀDWLRQIDFWRUVDUHEHORZWKHFXW-off value of 4, and thus multicollinearity is not a 
concern in this analysis (Neter et al., 1996). Since the dependent variables are dummy 
variables (entrepreneurship entry ± 1 or 0; opportunity entrepreneurship ± 1 or 0; necessity 
entrepreneurship ± 1 or 0), the study employed logistic regression analysis using STATA.  
 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3, 4, and 5 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
For testing the effect on entrepreneurship entry, the research calculated four logit 
regression models each of the years 2002 and 2009, as shown in Tables 6 and 7. By analyzing 
the results separately for the two periods, the study tests for the moderating effect of property 
rights regime change through the split-sample approach (Gujarati and Gunasekar, 2004; 
Hayes, 2013). Model 1 includes the control variables; Models 2 and 3 add the individual 
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human capital variable and the individual financial capital variable respectively in isolation; 
and Model 4 has both the two individual-level resources.  
From Model 4 (in Tables 6 and 7), it can be observed that the effect of individual-
OHYHOKXPDQFDSLWDORQHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLSFKRLFHLQLVQRWVLJQLILFDQWȕ S!
while theUH LV D VLJQLILFDQW SRVLWLYH HIIHFW LQ  ȕ    S   7KLV UHVXOW RIIHUV
support to Hypothesis 1. It is also found that there exists a significant negative effect of 
ILQDQFLDOFDSLWDOȕ -0.59, p < 0.001) on individual entrepreneurship choice in 2002, and a 
VLJQLILFDQWSRVLWLYHHIIHFW LQȕ S7KHFKL-square test result between 
WKH FRHIILFLHQWV IRU LQGLYLGXDO ILQDQFLDO FDSLWDO IRU WKH WZR \HDUV ZDV VLJQLILFDQW Ȥ2 (1) = 
17.22, p < 0.01), suggesting that property rights protection made a significant difference in 
the investment of financial capital towards entrepreneurship. This result offers support to 
Hypothesis 2.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
In Table 8, results from logit regression analysis on the two forms of entrepreneurship 
(opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship) are presented. It is found that individual human 
capital has an insignificant effect on opportunity entrepreneurship for both the selected years. 
Hence, there is no support for Hypothesis 3a. The effect of individual financial capital on 
opportunity entrepreneurship, however, offers support to Hypothesis 3b, as the results suggest 
that the protection of property rights encouraged people to invest their financial capital 
towards RSSRUWXQLW\HQWUHSUHQHXUVKLSȕ S, with the effect being insignificant 
in the earlier period.  
Though existing research did not expect property rights protection to have a 
significant effect on necessity entrepreneurship, this study found contrary evidence. In this 
study, individual human capital has a significant negative impact on necessity 
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entrepreneurship entry choice, with the effect decreasing after the property rights regime 
change. The result of the chi-square test between the coefficients for individual human capital 
for the two years was significant for necessity entrepreneurship. This result suggests that 
property rights protection made a significant difference in the investment of human capital 
towards necessity entrepreneurship, thereby supporting Hypothesis 4a. Furthermore, in the 
absence of property rights, there is an adverse effect on individuals¶LQYHVWPHQWRIILQDQFLDO
FDSLWDOWRZDUGVQHFHVVLW\HQWUHSUHQHXUVKLSȕ -1.45, p < 0.001), whereas during the period 
of property rights protection there was no significant effect. This offers partial support to 
Hypothesis 4b.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
--------------------------------- 
6. Discussion 
This study uses the unique setting of institutional transition in China to understand the effect 
of property rights on entrepreneurship in state-controlled economies. The main contribution 
of the work is in understanding the contingent effect of property rights policy changes in 
China on the investment of individual resources towards entrepreneurship entry, and how the 
effect varies for opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship. 
The study results for Hypothesis 1 suggest that individual human capital has a 
positive effect on individual entrepreneurship entry only during the post-property rights 
period, with the effect being non-significant in the pre-property rights period. The 
insignificant effect in the pre-property rights period goes against prior evidence that argues 
for a positive relationship between individual human capital and entrepreneurship choice 
(Davidsson and Honig, 2003; De Clercq et al., 2013). This insignificant effect implies that 
property rights protection is a critical factor when it comes to the investment of individuals¶
human capital towards starting a venture. Moreover, it indicates that, during weak property 
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rights protection in state-controlled economies, people would prefer to direct their human 
capital towards paid employment rather than risk it towards a more uncertain self-
employment initiative 2¶%ULHQ et al., 2003; Batjargal, 2007).  
From results corresponding to Hypothesis 2, the study finds that during the pre-
property rights period there is a negative and significant effect of financial capital on 
entrepreneurial entry and this relationship becomes significant during the post-property rights 
period. This observation also offers contradictory evidence to previous research which had 
found a positive correlation between individual financial capital and entrepreneurship choice 
(Arenius and Minniti, 2005; De Clercq et al., 2013). The chi-square test result confirmed that 
the property rights regime change made a significant difference to the investment of 
individual financial capital towards entrepreneurship in China. This result suggests that, for 
an investment of personal financial capital, entrepreneurs need to be assured of protection for 
their property. Such assured protection will also enable them to handle other associated risks, 
such as financial security of the family, fear of bankruptcy, and loss of reputation (Shane and 
Cable, 2002; Li, 2004; Bergmann and Sternberg, 2007; Lee et al., 2011). 
Based on the results for the investment of capital towards the two forms of 
entrepreneurship (Hypotheses 3 and 4), the research finds that higher levels of personal 
capital encourage opportunity entrepreneurship and necessity entrepreneurship differently, 
and its effect is contingent on the property rights protection. There is an insignificant impact 
on individual human capital on opportunity entrepreneurship entry during both the periods, 
suggesting a limited influence of property rights protection on human capital investment 
towards opportunity entrepreneurship. However, contrary to the expectations (Block and 
Wagner, 2010; Baptista et al., 2014), it was found that property rights protection has a 
significant effect on the investment of both human and financial capital towards necessity 
entrepreneurship. In the case of necessity entrepreneurship during both the periods, it was 
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observed that the effect of individual human capital is negative and significant. The chi-
square result confirms that the property rights regime made a significant difference in 
reducing the magnitude of the negative significant effect between individual human capital 
and necessity entrepreneurship choice. In addition, there is a negative and significant impact 
on individual financial capital and necessity entrepreneurship in the pre-property rights 
period that becomes non-significant in the post-property rights era. These effects of property 
rights on investment of private capital towards necessity entrepreneurship were unexpected, 
given that necessity entrepreneurship is associated with lower levels of complexity and is a 
choice made when there is a lack of alternatives (Reynolds et al., 2005; Thurik et al., 2008; 
Xavier-Oliveira et al., 2015).  
The results of the effect of individual financial capital on the different forms of 
entrepreneurship help to better understand the negative influence of individual financial 
capital on overall entrepreneurship in 2002 (Table 6) and the subsequent positive impact in 
2009 (Table 7). Private financial capital had an active and significant effect on opportunity 
entrepreneurship only in the post-property rights period, with the effect being non-significant 
in the pre-property rights era. On the other hand, the relationship between financial capital 
and necessity entrepreneurship is negative and significant in the pre-property rights period, 
while it is non-significant in the post-property rights period. This negative and non-
significant relationship suggests that the overall negative influence of personal financial 
capital on entrepreneurship in 2002 could be attributed to necessity entrepreneurship entry, 
while the positive effect in 2009 could be due to the effect on opportunity entrepreneurship 
entry. These findings emphasize that property rights protection and well-functioning markets 
are crucial for financial investment towards innovative activity led by opportunity 
entrepreneurs (McMullen et al., 2008; Autio and Acs, 2010). It further reveals that property 
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rights are not just essential for opportunity entrepreneurship but are equally relevant for 
necessity entrepreneurship as well. 
7. Conclusions 
7.1. Contributions 
This study makes several theoretical contributions. The primary contribution is to the 
literature on entrepreneurship and innovation in emerging markets (Ahmed et al., 2005; 
Yamakawa et al., 2013; Chatterjee and Sahasranamam, 2014; Bruton and Chen, 2016; 
Sahasranamam and Sud, 2016). It also extends the literature on the role of property rights 
protection in state-controlled economies (Krug and Hendrischke, 2003, 2008; Li, 2004; 
Schmiele, 2013; Marcotte, 2014; Chatterjee and Sahasranamam, 2018). This study observes 
that in economies undergoing an institutional transition, such as China, there is a strong 
disincentive for individuals to invest their human and financial capital towards starting a new 
venture in the absence of legislation offering property rights protection. Previous research 
highlighted the importance of property rights protection for opportunity entrepreneurship but 
not necessity entrepreneurship (Block et al., 2015; McMullen et al., 2008). However, the 
findings of this study highlight that property rights protection becomes equally important for 
necessity entrepreneurship in institutional contexts like China. This result complements the 
findings from the research by Cai (2015), which presented case studies from China on the 
transition from necessity to opportunity entrepreneurship and found that cultural and 
institutional factors were crucial in influencing necessity entrepreneurship. 
This research also adds to the growing literature on the importance of institutional 
context on individual entrepreneurial behavior (De Clercq et al., 2013; Estrin et al., 2013b, 
2016; Marvel et al., 2016). These findings align well with existing research evidence which 
suggests that, though individual resources are necessary, they are probably not sufficient 
conditions to influence entrepreneurship choice (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; McMullen 
22 
 
et al., 2008), and that institutional factors like property rights are equally important (Krug and 
Hendrischke, 2003; Jimenez et al., 2017).  
The findings of this research offer various policy implications. Firstly, the Chinese 
economy today is shifting from manufacturing-based, export-led growth to a more services-
oriented, domestic-consumption-based model (Krug and Hendrischke, 2003, 2008; Jiao et al., 
2011). This change marks an onset of a different approach from economies of scale or cost 
advantage to one of product differentiation and innovation. For making a successful shift in 
this direction, transparency at government level and encouragement of entrepreneurship are 
important (Li, 2004; Peng, 2004; Tonoyan et al., 2010). In this regard, from a policy 
perspective, these research findings highlight the importance of property rights legislative 
changes for encouraging individuals to invest their private resources towards starting new 
business activities.  
Secondly, until now there has been an assumption that property rights primarily 
concern only opportunity entrepreneurs, who are driven by innovation, rather than necessity 
entrepreneurs, who are driven by lack of alternatives (McMullen et al., 2008). Therefore, 
governments were encouraged to protect property rights only for opportunity 
entrepreneurship and not for necessity entrepreneurship. However, the results of this study 
highlight that governments need to offer due acknowledgment to protecting property rights 
even in the case of necessity entrepreneurship, and specifically in state-controlled economies 
like China. This becomes even more important when considering the evidence that nearly 
two-thirds of those who start off as necessity-oriented entrepreneurs turn into opportunity-
oriented entrepreneurs (Williams and Round, 2009).  
7.2. Limitations and future research 
Like any other research, there are certain limitation to this study particularly on the data. As 
mentioned earlier, the database allowed the study for only certain periods when data was 
23 
 
available. However, since the aim was to investigate the effect of property rights legislation 
change, the chosen years of 2002 and 2009 are appropriate. Similarly, the limitations of the 
database led to the use of single item constructs for operationalizing human capital and 
financial capital. The study tested for the moderating effect on only one country-level factor, 
namely, property rights. It is important to acknowledge that the cross-sectional design limited 
the possibility to control from other country-level factors. However, from Table 2, it can be 
observed that macro-environment factors other than those related to property rights have 
remained relatively stable during the 2002±2009 period, indicating the significance of 
property rights protection. Finally, this research considers only entrepreneurial intention and 
not the actual commencement of the enterprise. Though this might be a limitation, past 
research has observed that higher levels of purpose are a good reflection of actual action in a 
vast number of new enterprises (De Clercq et al., 2013; Levie and Autio, 2013). Despite 
these limitations, this study offers an understanding of the joint effect of individual resources 
and property rights on entrepreneurship in state-controlled economies like China. 
Previous research has found that concentration of innovation in China is driven by 
agglomeration forces related to industry specialization (Crescenzi et al., 2012). It has also 
been observed that different regions in China have adapted differently to the institutional 
transition (Shen and Tsai, 2016). Therefore, the talent pool and expertise related to a 
particular industry are likely to be co-located in distinct clusters or regions. Hence, future 
research could study the effect of industry- and cluster-OHYHO FRQGLWLRQV RQ LQGLYLGXDOV¶
investment of resources towards business creation in China. As mentioned earlier, during the 
weak property rights regime, guanxi and informal networks played a crucial role in 
encouraging entrepreneurship (Li and Li, 2000; Guo and Miller, 2010; Nee and Opper, 2012). 
Hence, it would be interesting to explore the combined influence that property rights and 
informal institutions have on encouraging individual resource investments towards firm 
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creation in China. Given the contrary evidence about necessity entrepreneurship, there is a 
need for further research to explore the effect of other institutional factors on necessity 
entrepreneurship in China and other countries that have undergone similar institutional 
transitions. Future research could also extend upon the work of Alon et al. (2013) to explore 
the contingent role of property rights transition on the internationalization of Chinese 
entrepreneurial firms. Similarly, given prior evidence of institutional context influencing the 
various variants of entrepreneurship like social and corporate differently in similar emerging 
market contexts (Agrawal and Sahasranamam, 2016; Sahasranamam and Ball, 2016, 2018), 
future research could extend this study to such contexts within China.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual model 
 







2002 6.97 5.61 12.34 
2003 5.45 6.11 11.59 
2005 7.30 6.22 13.72 
2006 9.59 6.27 16.19 
2007 9.84 6.21 16.43 
2009 9.17 9.09 18.70 
 *Extended from Sahasranamam and Sud (2016) to include 2009 statistics.
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Table 2. Macro-environmental characteristics of China for the period 2002±2009 






















2002 1141.76 8.36 -0.65 -0.05 -0.36 -0.53 -0.41 -1.57 
2003 1280.59 9.34 -0.4 -0.03 -0.56 -0.33 -0.46 -1.54 
2004 1498.17 9.42 -0.55 0 -0.36 -0.27 -0.43 -1.45 
2005 1740.09 10.7 -0.63 -0.09 -0.47 -0.13 -0.48 -1.49 
2006 2082.18 12.06 -0.5 0.08 -0.54 -0.18 -0.54 -1.68 
2007 2673.29 13.6 -0.59 0.19 -0.49 -0.15 -0.44 -1.66 
2008 3441.22 9.06 -0.54 0.15 -0.48 -0.13 -0.33 -1.64 




Table 3. Summary statistics of the sample 
 
2002 2009 
Variables Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Individual entrepreneurship choice 0.05 0.23 0.07 0.25 
Individual human capital 0.35 0.47 0.37 0.48 
Individual financial capital 0.61 0.48 0.69 0.46 
Individual social capital 0.57 0.49 0.59 0.49 
Age 40.20 12.13 38.93 11.86 
Gender 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.49 
Fear of failure 0.35 0.47 0.30 0.46 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix for 2002 (N = 2054) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Individual 
entrepreneurship choice 
1       
2. Individual human capital 0.17* 1      
3. Individual financial capital -0.03 0.11* 1     
4. Individual social capital 0.11* 0.32* 0.16* 1    
5. Age -0.09* -0.21* -0.13* -0.19* 1   
6. Gender 0.07* 0.18* 0.08* 0.07* -0.01 1  
7. Fear of failure 0.01 0.04* -0.06* 0.07* 0.00 -0.02* 1 
*p < 0.05; Source: GEM 2002. 
Table 5. Correlation matrix for 2009 (N=3068) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Individual 
entrepreneurship choice 
1       
2. Individual human capital 0.17* 1      
3. Individual financial capital 0.07* 0.09* 1     
4. Individual social capital 0.12* 0.25* 0.12* 1    
5. Age -0.06* -0.07* -0.12* -0.09* 1   
6. Gender 0.04* 0.12* 0.04* 0.06* 0.06* 1  
7. Fear of failure -0.02 -0.05* -0.00 0.05* 0.03 -0.07* 1 




Table 6. Logit regression results predicting entrepreneurship entry in 2002 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 




































Explanatory variables     




H2: Individual financial 
capital 












Log-likelihood -429.43 -425.05 -399.04 -395.52 
No. of observations 2048 2029 1919 1901 
*p< 0.10 **p< 0.05 ***p< 0.001; Standard errors specified in parenthesis. 
Table 7. Logit regression results predicting entrepreneurship entry in 2009 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 

































Explanatory variables     
















Log-likelihood -847.46 -841.19 -821.68 -819.40 
No. of observations 2979 2947 2860 2847 




Table 8. Logit regression results predicting opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship entry 
in 2002 and 2009 
 2002 2009 
Variables OE NE OE NE 

































Explanatory variables     
























Log-likelihood -427.38 -364.27 -918.00 -977.52 
No. of observations 1901 1901 2847 2847 
*p< 0.10 **p< 0.05 ***p< 0.001; Standard errors specified in parenthesis. 
